This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in an auction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the other bidders before they bid. Our results show that the incentives are stronger in a sealed bid (second price) auction than in an open (English) auction when the information acquired refers to a common component of the value. However, the ranking is the opposite when the information acquired refers to a private component of the value, at least for a large number of bidders. Our results seem to be due to differences on the strength of the winner's curse, although a more careful analysis show that the key force is rather the loser's curse.
Introduction
Most auction theory models assume that bidders have some private information. However, very little is known about the origin of this private information and in particular, the incentives of bidders to acquire it. This is not only an important theoretical question but also of practical concern in auction design. The reason is that more or less information acquisition affects to both the efficiency of the allocation implemented in the auction and the revenue generated.
In this paper, we shall study the bidder's incentives to acquire information about the value that she may get from the object for sale. In particular, we shall focus on the case in which a bidder's information acquisition decision is observed by the other bidders, what we call open information acquisition. This model allows a richer theoretical problem than the model in which the bidder's information acquisition decision is not observed by the other bidders. The reason is that in the latter model information acquisition is not a strategic variable as it is in our case.
Moreover, there are relevant real-life auctions in which the open information acquisition model is the most appropriate. For instance, bidders that want to acquire information in oil tract auctions use exploratory drills that are easily visible. There are also other cases in which the auctioneer can control whether the bidders' information acquisition decision is observable. Consider again the example of oil tract auctions. It is quite common that bidders that want to run exploratory drills have to communicate it to the auctioneer who can decide whether to reveal it.
In our paper, we shall compare the incentives to acquire information in two standard auction formats: a (second price) sealed bid auction, and an open (English) auction. Both formats are similar in the sense that, in both cases, the winner pays the highest losing bid. However, they differ in one important aspect. The sealed bid auction is a static game in which the only information revealed occurs when the auction is over, whereas the open auction is a dynamic game in which there is a lot of information revelation along the game, particularly all the losing bids. Thus, the comparison between these two auction formats is interesting not only by itself, but also because it isolates the effect of the information revealed in a dynamic auction on the incentives to acquire information.
We shall show that this difference may have important effects on the incentives to acquire information. Our results show that in a model in which the bidder's uncertainty about her value has private components and components common to all bidders, the incentives to acquire more information about the common components in the sealed bid auction are higher than in the open auction. However, the ranking is the opposite, at least if there are sufficiently many bidders, when the information acquisition is about the private component of the value.
A reader familiar with auction theory may conjecture an intuitive explanation to the first effect based on the "winner's curse". If one bidder acquires private information about a common component of the value, her bid becomes more informative of the common value and thus, we may expect that it increases the "winner's curse" on the other bidders. This suggests that there is a strategic effect that makes the rivals' bids lower and hence increases the bidder's incentives to acquire information.
We may expect the former effect to be larger in the sealed bid auction than in the open auction. The reason is that there is less uncertainty about the value, and thus a greater "winner's curse", in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction because of the information revealed along the game. We shall show, however, that we said before is not completely correct and that the intuition is slightly more subtle. The key effect is a symmetric force to the "winner's curse" that has been called the "loser's curse. 1 " Again, a reader familia with auction literature can also conjecture an explanation to the second result based on the "winner's curse". Information acquisition about the private value produces a (mean preserving) spread in the bidder's conditional expected private value, which induces a similar spread in the bidder's bids. The fact that our bidder high bids become higher affect the high bids of the other bidders. The reason is that, as Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) have argued, an increase in the bids of a bidder increases the winner's curse on the others, and hence, induce them to bid lower. 2 The opposite happens to low bids of the other bidders because of symmetric reasons, although these bids are less relevant when there are sufficiently many bidders since the price is more often fixed by high bids. This explains that the above strategic effect increases the incentives to acquire information about the private value, at least when there are sufficiently many bidders.
The above effect should be greater in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction. The reason is that in the sealed bid auction, the other bidders have uncertainty of whether the bidder that has acquired information is bidding low or high, whereas this uncertainty does not exist in the open auction. We shall see that all these effects can be accurately explained using the "loser's curse."
The issue of bidders' open information acquisition in auctions have received little attention in spite of its importance, both practical and theoretical. There are only some some partial results as a by side product, for instance, in the work of EngelbrechtWiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983) , Hernando-Veciana (2004) . Hernando-Veciana (2005) and Larson (2004) provide a careful analysis of the value of information in auctions that has implications on open information acquisition. The main two differences with our work is that they do not consider the sealed bid auction 3 and that they only consider the value of information about the common value.
One possible explanation for this lack of attention are the technical difficulties inherent to the analysis of what has been called asymmetric auctions. These are auctions in which bidders differ from an ex ante point of view, or in other words, where the identity of bidders matters. Most of the work in auction theory requires the study of sophisticated mathematical models that can only be solved explicitly appealing to the anonymity assumption. In fact, it is complex to provide conditions that assure existence of the equilibrium once asymmetries between bidders are allowed, see for instance Athey (2000) .
But, when bidders' information acquisition decisions are observed before the beginning of the auction game, one must necessarily consider asymmetric auctions. Even if we study a symmetric equilibrium in which bidders acquire the same level of information in equilibrium, one must solve the auction game for deviations of this symmetric equilibrium. In these deviations, a bidder takes a different information acquisition decision than the non-deviating bidders. Since the other bidders observe the deviating bidder choice before the auction stage, we can no longer analyze the auction as a symmetric game.
There exists some other papers that have studied the problem of bidders' information acquisition when each bidder's choice is unobserved by the other bidders. For instance, Matthews (1984) look to the question of information aggregation when bidders may choose how much information to acquire; and Persico (2000) compare the bidders' incentives to acquire information in first price and second price auctions.
A closely related paper that lies between the models of open and hidden information acquisition is that by Compte and Jehiel (2002) . They also compare the sealed bid auction and the open auction. However, their paper differs from ours in that they study a pure private value model, in which there is no issue about the "winner's curse" or "loser's curse." The private value assumption makes also irrelevant whether the information acquisition choices are observed or not as in this case there are no strategic effects, at least for the auction formats that Compte and Jehiel (2002) study. The key in their model is that in the open auction bidders may acquire information along the auction and depending on how the auction evolves, and thus, the open auction gives the option of "wait and see" before taking the information acquisition decision. In spite of the different assumptions, they obtain the same ranking as ours for information acquisition about the private value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section provides the assumptions of the model and the main results. Section 3 discusses at a more or less intuitive level two issues: how the information acquisition decision of one bidder may have strategic effects on the incentives to change the bid of the others, and how this change in incentives to bid differs across auction formats and explains our rankings. Section 4 provides the equilibrium analysis that establishes our results and Section 5 concludes. We also include an Appendix with the most technical proofs.
The Model
We study a model in which bidders' values have common and private components, and bidders' types are informative of both, the common and the private value. In our model, we also allow the precision of the bidders' information about the common and the private value component to vary.
More precisely, we assume that there is a set 4 I = {1, 2, ..., n} (n ≥ 3) of risk neutral bidders. A generic bidder i ∈ I puts a monetary value of T i + j∈I Q j (i ∈ I) in the consumption of the good. Note that T i (for taste) is a private value component as it only affects i's preferences whereas Q i (for quality) is a common value component that affects all bidders' preferences.
Note that we are assuming additive separability of the utility function. This assumptions largely simplifies our problem as it allows us a straightforward application of the techniques developed by Myerson (1981) . Moreover, it simplifies enormously the comparison of the allocation implemented in each of the auction games we study. We could get similar results assuming additive separability only of the private and the common value. We also conjecture that a marginal version of our results must also hold true when we relaxed this assumption. The reason is that any smooth function can be approximately linearized locally.
We assume that all the vector of random variables (T 1 , ..., T n , Q 1 , ...Q n ) are statistically independent. From a technical point of view, this assumption simplifies our problem since we can apply Myerson's (1981) techniques, but more importantly, it allows us to abstract from the non-strategic incentives to acquire information. Under this assumption, it may be shown that both the open auction and the sealed bid auction induce the same incentives to acquire information covertly, which is not the case when the bidders' private signals are correlated across bidders. In fact, an adaptation of the arguments given by Persico (2000) shows that the sealed bid auction gives larger incentives to acquire information than the open auction in a particular sense.
We shall assume that Bidder i ∈ I observes a noisy signal informative of Q i and T i which we assume to be an element of the family {X η i } η i ∈N . We assume that each of these signals is informative of both T i and Q i . We shall impose some structure on this family of signals to ensure that the realizations of the signals can be ordered in the sense of higher realizations induce higher bidding and that the family of signals can be ordered in the sense that a higher η means a more informative signal.
Under our assumptions of additive separability and independency of the bidders' types, it is easy to see that the utility of a bidder in any auction game, and for some fixed strategies of the other bidders, is linear in the state, this is in T i and in Q i . An application of the results of Athey and Levin (2001) [Lemma 1] to such decision problems shows that a sufficient condition to assure the existence of an increasing best response is that E[V i |X η i = x] is increasing in x, for V i ∈ {T i , Q i }, and for any η. Note that in our particular case, this is not restrictive as we could always reorder the signal's realizations to obtain the required monotonicity.
To make our arguments clearer, we normalize the marginal distribution of each of the signals {X η i } η i ∈N to be uniform on [0, 1] . To see why this normalization is without loss of generality, suppose that our original signal X η i i had a distribution function G that was not uniform. We could define a new signalX
The new signal is equally informative of either T i or Q i since it is a monotone transformation 5 of X η i i . Athey and Levin (2001) gives us a meaningful definition of more informative signals for decision problems that are linear in the state. Under the above normalization, this definition is as follows: An application of Theorem 1 of Athey and Levin (2001) implies that our definition is such that a signal X η is more informative than another signal X η if and only if, any decision maker with a utility function linear in the state can achieve higher expected utility with signal X η than with signal X η for a given prior. In this sense, our definition assures that the expected utility of a bidder that acquires a more informative signal increases when the information acquisition decision is not observed by the other bidders. In this sense, we identify more a informative signal with a more valuable signal.
Note that the intuitive meaning of our definition is that the more informative a signal is, the more pessimistic becomes the expected value conditional on bad news in the sense of X η i ≤ x. It may also be noted that our definition of more informative signal is equivalent to a second order stochastic spread of the expected value conditional on the signal.
To have more clear-cut results, we shall introduce a refinement in our definition of more informative signals. We shall indicate how our results would change had not we introduced this refinement.
The above condition is implied by our definition of more informative signal only for the case x = 1. This refinement on the definition is also less restrictive than the refinement that for
is increasing the more informative the signal is, a refinement that has been used, for instance, by Hagedorn (2004) .
Note that the inequality that defines monotonically more informative signals is equivalent to:
which may be interpreted that a more informative signal makes the conditional expected value becomes more optimistic conditional on good news in the sense of X η i ≥ x even when we condition additionally on X η i ≤ x. We also introduce some symmetry assumptions across bidders. In particular, we assume that for all η ∈ N the joint distribution of the vector (T i , Q i , X η i ) is the same 6 The strict inequality is assumed to avoid some trivial problems in Lemma 4.
across bidders. This implies that the conditional expected values E[T i |X
are the same across bidders, for a any η ∈ N . We also introduce some regularity assumptions. We assume that
have a continuous derivatives and are strictly increasing in x for any η ∈ N . We also assume that the function
Next example illustrates our assumptions:
Example: Suppose that Q i and T i , ∀i ∈ I, follow an independent uniform distribution with support [0, 1], and that X η i = Q i with probability η T (η), and X η i = T i with probability η Q (η), and with probability 1−η T (η)−η Q (η) an independent random variable with uniform distribution, where η T and η Q are increasing functions. To see that higher values of η mean in this example monotonically more informative signals, note that
We are interested in studying the bidders' incentives to acquire information openly. To do so, we have to solve the bidding game for different vectors of bidders' information precisions, a problem that in general may be cumbersome. To make things simpler, we shall focus on situations in which all the bidders' signals but one have the same information precision. Note that these are the only cases that we need to consider if we want to study symmetric equilibria of games with an information acquisition stage.
To keep coherency with the former story we shall call the bidder with different information precision the deviating bidder, and we shall denote its index by d ∈ I. We shall refer to the other bidders as non-deviating bidders. We also use η d and η to refer to the information precision of the deviating bidder and the non-deviating bidders, respectively.
We shall compare the bidders' incentives to acquire information in two auction formats, an open auction 8 (O) and a sealed bid (second price) auction 9 (S). Our equilibrium analysis will be based on the (perfect) Bayesian equilibrium, and for the sake 7 A sufficient condition for this regularity assumption is that the cumulative distribution function of the random variable ρ(X
, is log-concave, an assumption satisfied by many distribution functions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) , for instance any distribution function of the form F (q) = q r , r ≥ 1, and any truncated exponential, normal, logistic, extreme-value, chi-square, chi, and Laplace distributions. This is also equivalent to the assumption that φ −1 is log-concave. 8 We assume that the auction procedure is as follows, at every moment of time there are two types of bidders: active bidders and inactive bidders. Bidders are active until they manifest that they want to become inactive. Once a bidder has decided to become inactive her decision is irreversible. The identity of the active bidders is publicly observable along the auction. The price is also publicly observable and increases continuously from zero. At each moment in time bidders can decide to become inactive. The price stops increasing whenever there is no more than one active bidder. In this case, the remaining active bidder gets one unit. If there is no active bidder when the price stops, the good is randomly allocated (with equal probability) among the bidders that quit at the last price. The price paid by all the winners is the price at which the auction stopped.
9 In this auction set-up, all bidders submit simultaneously one bid each. The bidder that have submitted the highest bid gets the good at the price of the second highest bid. If two bidders submit the highest bid, the price equals this bid and the good is allocated randomly among all the bidders that submitted the highest bid, whereby all such bidders have the same probability of being selected.
of simplicity, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium in the sense that all the non-deviating bidders use the same strategy.
In most of the paper we shall focus on two cases that are specially clear-cut: 
Strategic Effects Associated to Information Acquisition
In this section, we analyze the effects that a bidder's information acquisition decision may have on the other bidders' incentives to change their bid. To this aim, we start with the study of these incentives.
In both auction formats, the sealed bid auction and the open auction, a bidder's bid only determines whether the bidder wins or losses the auction, but not the price that she pays when she wins. This is equal to the highest bid of the other bidders. A marginal increase (or decrease) in the bid makes the bidder pass from losing to winning (respectively, from winning to losing) but only if she was tying with the highest bid of the other bidders. Consequently, a bidder's incentives to change her bid marginally will depend on the expected utility of winning the auction conditional on the event tying with the highest bid of the other bidders. If this expected utility is positive, the bidder has incentives to increase her bid, and if it is negative the bidder has incentives to decrease her bid.
The event described above is the intersection of two other events that we use below to understand a bidder's incentives to change her bid. The first one is that the highest bid of the other bidders must be greater than the price, say p. Note that it is good news about the common value, and hence induces greater incentives to increase the bid. This event has been called the loser's curse as a bidder who ignores this event will bid too low and regret losing. The second event is that the highest bid of the other bidders must be less than p. Note that it is bad news about the common value, and hence induces lower incentives to increase the bid. This event has been called the winner's curse as a bidder who ignores this event will bid too high and regret winning.
The open auction is a complicated dynamic game. However, the final price and the winner of the auction, and hence the incentives to change the bid, only depend in general on what happens in information sets with two bidders active. Moreover, since our interest is on the expected utility of the deviating bidder, we only need to consider information sets in which the deviating bidder is one of the two bidders that remain bidding. The information that the non-deviating bidder can learn from the loser's curse is that the bid of the the deviating bidder must be greater than p, whereas the winner's curse conveys that the bid of the deviating bidder must be less than p. To understand the latter note that, in equilibrium, the uncertainty of a remaining bidder has been reduced to the type of the other remaining bidder. This is because the other bidders' types can be inferred from the prices at which they quit.
We next formalize the incentives of a non-deviating bidder, say Bidder i, with type x i to change marginally the bid around p to illustrate the loser's curse and the winner's curse in the open auction:
where b O d denotes the bid function used by the deviating bidder in the above information sets, and X the information inferred along the equilibrium path.
The interpretation of the events loser's curse and winner's curse for a non-deviating bidder is slightly more complex in the sealed bid auction since this bidder has uncertainty about whether the highest bid of the other bidders is the bid of the deviating bidder or the bid of another non-deviating bidder. In general, the non-deviating bidder will put a positive probability on each of the two cases. This implies that the loser's curse means that with some probability the bid of the deviating bidder is greater than p and with the complementary probability the highest bid of the non-deviating bidders is greater than p. The winner's curse is more straightforward. It always means that all the other bidders bid less than p.
Again, to illustrate the loser's curse and the winner's curse, we formalize the incentives of a non-deviating bidder with type x i to change her bid marginally around a price p:
where b S d denotes the bid function of the deviating bidder, b S nd the bid function used by all the other non-deviating bidders, and 10 ρ the probability that the bid of the deviating bidder is the highest bid of the other bidders given that the latter bid is equal to p.
Consider first the common value information model. If the deviating bidder acquires a more informative signal, it increases both the loser's and the winner's curse of the non-deviating bidders, and hence affects the non-deviating bidders' incentives to change their bids. But the increase of the winner's curse affects both auction formats 10 To make our arguments clearer we assume ρ to be constant, but as we shall see in the next section, ρ will depend in general on b with the same magnitude, whereas the increase of the loser's curse is stronger in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction. The reason is that in the latter case it only affects with probability ρ. Consequently, we may expect that the strategic effect of information acquisition will favor more information acquisition in the sealed bid auction than in the open auction.
Consider next the private value information model. In this case, there is no direct effect. However, a more informative signal induces a more spread (in the sense of second order stochastic dominance) of the deviating bidder's conditional expected private value and, hence, of her bids. We shall argue that this effect has the opposite consequences on the non-deviating bidders' bids, this is, it makes them less spread.
The fact that the deviating bidder makes even higher her high bids affects the non-deviating bidders' incentives to submit high bids. The reason is that higher bids by the deviating bidder means that the bad news of the winner's curse becomes worse and the good news of the loser's curse not so good. The combination of both effects should induce the non-deviating bidders to make their high bids lower. 11 Symmetric reasons explain that the fact that the deviating bidder makes even lower her low bids induces the non-deviating bidders to maker their low bids higher. The consequences of these strategic effects of information acquisition on the deviating bidder are unclear. Nevertheless, if the number of bidders is sufficiently large, we may expect this strategic effect to favor the deviating bidder, as she competes more often with the types of the non-deviating bidders that submit high bids.
Again the change in the winner's curse affects equally to both auction formats, but the change in the loser's curse is stronger in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction. These means that the positive strategic effect of information acquisition that appears when the number of bidders is sufficiently large should be stronger in the open auction than in the sealed bid auction. As a consequence, we may expect more information acquisition in the former auction than in the latter.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we provide the equilibrium analysis of our two auction games. This analysis will show that the effects studied in the former section translate into some equilibrium results that support the ranking of auctions with respect to the incentives to acquire information that we suggested.
To prove our equilibrium, we start proposing an allocation that satisfy some equilibrium restrictions, and later we use this allocation to construct the equilibrium strategies. In the case of symmetric equilibrium (in which the good is always sold), an allocation can be described simply with a function, that we call allocation function, that maps types of the deviating bidder into types of the non-deviating bidders. The good goes to the highest type of the non-deviating bidders if its image is higher than the deviating bidder's type. Otherwise, the good goes to the deviating bidder.
Clearly, for a given equilibrium, the corresponding allocation function maps types of the deviating bidder into types of the non-deviating bidders, if any, that submit the same bid. Hence, we may compute the allocation function from equilibrium restrictions that relate these types.
In particular, our equilibrium condition will look at the bidder's incentives to change her bid marginally. These incentives were described in the former section. We concluded that if the expected utility of winning conditional on tying with the highest bid of the other bidders is positive, the bidder has incentives to increase her bid, and if it is negative the bidder has incentives to decrease her bid. As a consequence, in equilibrium the former conditional expected utility must be equal to zero. This is the equilibrium condition we shall use to deduce our allocation functions.
The Open Auction
Again, to deduce the allocation function implemented in the open auction it will suffice to look at the information sets in which only the deviating bidder and a non-deviating bidder, say Bidder i, remain bidding in the auction. These information sets impose sufficient restrictions to deduce the allocation function.
Denote by x i and x d the types of the non-deviating bidder and the deviating bidder, respectively, that bid in a given equilibrium the same price p in the above information sets. Denote also by X the information that these two bidders can infer along the equilibrium path about the types of the other bidders. For the reasons explained in the former section, our equilibrium condition for the non-deviating bidder is:
and similarly our equilibrium condition for the deviating bidder is:
If we subtract both equations, and after some simplifications, we get the following equation that relates x d and x i : Next proposition shows that there is an equilibrium that implements the allocation functionφ O . The reader may find in the proof of the next proposition the equilibrium strategies that support our allocation function. We do not include them in the main text since they are a straightforward generalization of the equilibrium proposed by Milgrom and Weber (1982 
Proof in the Appendix.
Note that in the proposed equilibrium, a deviating bidder with minimum type may get strictly positive expected utility. This is what happens when a deviating bidder with this type wins with positive probability, i.e. whenφ O (0) > 0.
The Sealed Bid Auction
We now proceed with the analysis of the sealed bid auction. Denote by x i and x d the types of the non-deviating bidder and the deviating bidder, respectively, that bid in a given equilibrium the same price p. Our equilibrium condition for the non-deviating bidder is: (6) where, ρ is the probability that i ties with the deviating bidder given that bidder i ties with the maximum bid of the other bidders at price p, this is,
, 12 Note that the expression that follows is never negative, since
where b S nd and b S d denote the equilibrium bid functions of the non-deviating bidder and the deviating bidder, respectively. Similarly, our equilibrium condition for the deviating bidder with type x d is in this case:
Suppose now that φ S (x) is the allocation function implemented in the sealed bid auction. This means that
. If we use this fact, and combine Equation 6 and Equation 7 eliminating p, we get after some algebra the following equation:
where
The right hand side of Equation (8) From the left hand side of Equation (8) we can get the following equation in x i and
that can be used to define implicitly a new function φ * . Note that this is possible because under our assumptions, the left hand side of Equation (9) is increasing in x d and decreasing in x i . Again, it may be the case that Equation (9) 
3. If φ S (1) exists, then φ S (1) ≥φ * (1), and if φ
Note that as it happens with φ O and φ * , the function φ S derived from the equilibrium conditions and its inverse φ S . The conditions provided in the third item of Lemma 1 will be used later in the proof of the next proposition to guaranty that we can extend the equilibrium bid functions out of the domains of φ S and φ −1 S , particularly in the cases in which eitherφ S (1) < 1 andφ
There exists an equilibrium of the sealed bid auction that implements the allocation functionφ S (x) and in which the deviating bidder with type 0 gets expected utility:
Equilibrium Incentives to Acquire Information
We shall now consider a bidder's incentives to acquire information. We introduce the following definition that captures the concept of incentives:
Definition: [Incentives to acquire information] We say that an auction a gives higher incentives to acquire information than another auction a if and only if the following two inequalities hold:
Where U a (η d , η) is the deviating bidder's expected utility in auction a when she has information precision η d and all the other bidders have information precision η.
The first point of the former definition says that the deviating bidder's expected utility increases more in auction a than in auction a when she deviates acquiring more information from the situation in which all the bidders have the same information precision, this is, the deviating bidder have greater incentives to deviate upwards in auction a than in auction a . Similarly, the second point says that the deviating bidder's expected utility decreases more in auction a than in auction a when she deviates acquiring less information from the situation in which all the bidders have the same information precision, this is, the deviating bidder have less incentives to deviate downwards in auction a than in auction a .
Independency of the bidders' types imply, see Myerson (1981) , that the allocation functions are sufficient to determine the bidders' expected utility and hence, their incentives to acquire more or less information. Moreover, the additive separability of the bidders' utility function makes specially simple the expression of the bidder's expected utility. Next lemma shows these claims.
Lemma 2. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium for a given auction mechanism in which allocation function φ is implemented. Then, the ex-ante expected utility of the deviating bidder in this equilibrium of the auction mechanism is equal to:
plus the expected utility that the deviating bidder gets when she has type 0.
Proof. Straightforward adaptation of the arguments by Myerson (1981) .
From this lemma, it is easy to see that when all bidders have the same level of information precision, a kind of revenue equivalence theorem holds in the sense that both the sealed bid and the open auction give bidders the same expected utility. To see why note that in a symmetric equilibrium, the allocation function is the identity in both auction formats. One consequence is that to prove that an auction have higher incentives, we only need to show that the deviating bidder's expected utility is higher in the former auction than in the latter when η d > η and viceversa, if η d < η. Moreover, Lemma 2 show that it is sufficient to look at the allocation functions.
We can now illustrate the results we anticipated for the common value information model with an equilibrium analysis:
Lemma 3. In the common value information model, we have thatφ O (x) = x, and if
Proof. The definition of φ O in Equation (5) implies that φ O is invariant to changes in η d in the common value information model. Moreover, our symmetry assumption implies that φ(x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. We next consider the case η d > η, the case η d < η is symmetric. In the common value information model and by definition of monotonically more informative µ(x, η d ) > µ(x, η), which means that,
to satisfy Equation (9). The application of the first item of Lemma 1 concludes the proof.
Corollary 1. In the common value information model, the sealed bid auction gives higher incentives to acquire information than the open auction.
Had we made use only of more informative signals instead of monotonically more informative signals, we could prove the above result, but only when the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
Next, we look at the private value information model.
Lemma 4. In the private value information model, there exists an
Proof. We only study the case η d > η, the other one is symmetric. Since
O (1)) < 1 to satisfy Equation (9), which implies that φ * (φ
). An application of the first item of Lemma 1 concludes the proof by continuity.
Corollary 2. In the private value information model, the open ascending auction gives higher incentives to acquire information than the sealed bid auction if n is large enough.
This last result does not make any use of our assumption that signals are ordered in the sense of monotonically more informative signals, we only need to assume that they are ordered in the sense of more informative signals.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the strategic effects associated to open information acquisition. This strategic effects are originated because a bidder's information acquisition decision affects the other bidders' bid behavior. In particular, we have shown that these strategic effects are such that a bidder has greater incentives to acquire information about the common value in a sealed bid auction than in an open auction. However, we have also shown that if the information acquisition is about the private value, the incentives are higher in an open auction than in a sealed bid auction, at least when the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
Certainly, it is not difficult to use our results to give some rankings of which auction induces more information acquisition once we add a stage before the auction in which which bidders may acquire additional information at some cost. Clearly, the results would be that the sealed bid auction induces more information acquisition if the additional information is about the common value, and the open auction induces more information acquisition if the additional information is about the private value. The latter result when the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
The results suggested in the paragraph are quite interesting since in the symmetric equilibrium of an auction, the more informed about the private value the bidders have the more efficient the allocation is. We could then conclude that the sealed bid auction implements a more efficient allocation than the open ascending auction in the model of the former paragraph.
Similarly, we also know that the more informed the bidders are the greater is the expected revenue generated in the auction, at least when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. See for instance Ganuza (2004) , Ganuza and Penalva-Zuasti (2004) and Hagedorn (2004) . Since under our assumptions our two auction formats are revenue equivalent for a given level of information of the bidders, we may conclude that depending on whether the bidders can acquire information about the common value or the private value, the sealed bid auction will give more or less expected revenue than the open auction.
APPENDIX
This Appendix has four parts. In Appendix A we provide an equilibrium for the open ascending auction that proves Proposition 1. Appendix B shows that there exists a solution to the differential equation of Lemma 1. Appendix C provides an equilibrium for the sealed bid auction that proves Proposition 2.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We start proposing some strategies. We proceed sequentially, first, information sets in which nobody has left the auction yet:
• Deviating bidder's bid function:
• Non-deviating bidder's bid function i = d:
In information sets in which k bidders have left the auction and where p l is the price at which the l-th bidder in declaring inactive has quit, and p l is her identity. First, when the non-deviating bidder is not among the k bidders that have left the auction.
• Non-deviating bidders' bid function, i = d:
And now, when the deviating bidder is among the bidders that has left the auction, i = d:
where recall that η l = η for any l = d.
To prove that the above strategies form an equilibrium, note first that the deviating bidder's expected value of the good conditional on the vector of bidders' types (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) is equal to:
Moreover, if all the non-deviating bidders follow the proposed strategy, the price that the deviating bidder pays if she wins is equal to the bid of the bidder with highest type among the non-deviating bidders, say Bidder l, this is:
After some algebra, we may show that the difference between these two values is equal to: (10) which is non negative if and only if
These are exactly the cases in which the deviating bidder wins if she follows the proposed strategy, and thus, she cannot improve by following a different strategy. The proof that the nondeviating bidders do not have incentives to deviate is similar, and hence, we do not include it.
Note next that the proposed strategies implementφ O . First, all non-deviating bidders use the same strictly increasing bid function, and second the deviating bidder wins the auction if and only ifφ(x d ) is greater than the maximum type of the nondeviating bidders.
Finally, straightforward computations show that the deviating bidder's expected utility with type 0 is as stated in the Proposition. Thus, our differential equation can be written as φ s (x) = Φ(x, φ s (x)). Define also the set S as the set of points in (x, φ)
Lemma 5. There exists a unique solution to the differential equation φ (x) = Φ(x, φ(x)) at passes by any point (x,φ) in the interior of S. Moreover, the solution is strictly increasing and with bounded derivative at (x,φ).
Proof. Φ(x, φ) is continuous in x and continuously differentiable in φ at any point in the interior of S, thus it satisfies a Lipschitz condition in all this set. Consequently, the first part of the lemma is a direct application of Coddington and Levinson (1984) [Theorem 2.2, pag. 10]. To prove the second part, note that at any point in the interior of S,
in the interior of S, which implies that the numerator and the denominator of the expression that defines Φ are strictly positive. This is because the numerator is equal to zero at φ = φ O (x) and it is strictly increasing in φ, moreover, the denominator is equal to zero at φ = φ * (x) and it is strictly decreasing in φ. The proof for the second case is similar.
Consider first two cases: (i)φ * (x) >φ O (x), and (ii)φ * (x) <φ O (x). In the first case, we can continue our local solution to the left. Since Φ(x, φ) goes to infinity as φ goes to φ * (x), and Φ(x, φ O (x)) = 0, the continuation solution remains in the interior of S until either x or φ reach zero, or the solution converges to a point in whicḣ φ * (x) =φ O (x). We can apply similar arguments to (ii) and continue our solution to the right until either x or φ reach one, or the solution converges to a point in whicḣ φ * (x) =φ O (x). Figure 1 illustrates our arguments for the case (i).
Consider now the case φ O (x) = φ * (x). We call these values of x crossing points. Clearly, φ S (x) = φ O (x) = φ * (x) is solution to our differential equation if x is a crossing point. If to the left of the crossing point, it holds that φ O (x) > φ * (x), we know from the arguments in the former paragraph that we can continue to the right any local solution in the interior of S and it will converge to the crossing between φ O (x) and φ * (x) as x tends to the crossing point. Something similar happens if to the right of the crossing point it holds that φ O (x) < φ * (x). In this case, we can continue local solutions to the left. The two remaining cases, either φ O (x) < φ * (x) to the left of a crossing point or φ O (x) > φ * (x) to the right of a crossing point, are more complicated. We prove existence for the latter case. The former case can be prove with a similar argument.
Denote in what follows by x c the crossing point with the property that for x close x c and to the right φ O (x) > φ * (x). We construct first a sequence of functions {φ τ } τ ∈T , where T is a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to x c . These functions are defined as follows: φ τ (x) = φ O (x) for x ∈ [x c , τ ], and it equals to a solution of the differential equation (8) with initial condition φ τ (τ ) = φ O (τ ) for x > τ . To see why this solution exists, note that Φ(x, φ) is continuous in x and continuously differentiable in φ when φ = φ O (x) = φ * (x), thus it satisfies a Lipschitz condition and by Coddington and Levinson (1984) [Theorem 2.2, pag. 10] the solution exists and it is unique. Moreover, since Φ(x, φ O (x)) = 0 if φ O (x) = φ * (x) the slope of our solution at the initial condition 
is zero, and hence when we move to the right, the solution enters in the interior of S and by Lemma 5, it can be continued. Once in the interior of S, Lema 5 assures that the the solutions to our differential are unique. This means that the functions φ τ and φ τ cannot cut in the interior of S. We can thus deduce that the sequence {phi τ (x)} T is decreasing and hence the function φ τ converges pointwise. We denote φ(x) its pointwise limit.
We can also define another differential equation:
. This new differential equation has very similar properties to φ (x) = Φ(x, φ(x)) and in fact we can provide an equivalent version of Lemma 5.
We can also construct a sequence of functions {x ζ } ζ∈Z , where Z is a decreasing function that converges to φ O (x c ) = φ S (x c ). Each of the functions x ζ is defined as follows: O (φ) = φ −1 * (φ) the slope of our solution at the initial condition is zero, and hence the solution also moves towards the interior of S and hence can be continued. Once in the interior of S by Lemma 5, x ζ must be strictly increasing. Since x ζ is also strictly increasing for φ < τ , x ζ is invertible. Denote by φ ζ the inverse of x ζ . Moreover, in the interior of S, and for the same arguments that we used for φ τ , the functions {x ζ } Z cannot cut and hence, {x ζ (φ)} Z is a decreasing sequence. This means that {φ ζ (x)} Z is an increasing sequence, and hence that it is convergent. We denote by φ the pointwise limit of {φ ζ } Z .
The functions φ and φ cannot across as otherwise, there should exists functions Moreover, if the deviating bidder wins the auction, she pays the bid of the highest type of the non-deviating bidders. If x i > φ S (1), then the price that the deviating bidder pays if she wins is equal to:
The difference between value and price is equal after some simplifications to:
which is less than,
Since x i ≥ φ S (1) which is greater thanφ * (1) by the third item of Lemma 1, the above expression must be negative. Our proposed bid function ensures the deviating bidder that she losses in these cases.
If x i ∈ [φ S (0),φ S (1)], then the price is equal to:
The difference between value and price in this case is equal to:
which is positive if and only if x d ≥φ S (x i ). Consequently, our proposed strategy assures the deviating bidder that she wins if it is profitable to win and losses otherwise. Finally, if x < φ S (0), then the price is equal to:
The difference between value and price after some simplifications becomes:
which is greater than,
. This last expression is positive since it is easy to check thatφ * (0) must be smaller thanφ O (0) and hence x i ≤φ O (0), since x i ≤ φ S (0). The proposed strategy assures the deviating bidder that she wins in these cases.
The proof that the non-deviating bidders do not have incentives to deviate is slightly different. Denote by p the price that a non-deviating bidder pays if she wins. If p > b nd (1), the price must be fixed by the deviating bidder with a type x d > φ −1 (1), in this case we can use similar arguments to the ones above to show that it is not profitable to win for the non-deviating bidder.
Suppose now that p ∈ [b nd (0), b nd (1)], then bidder i's expected value of the good conditional on the auction price equal to p is equal to:
where, ρ(x) = , and x j = b −1 nd (p). Clearly, p is equal to the bid of a non-deviation bidder with type x j , which by definition ofφ S , is equal to:
The difference between value and price is positive if and only if x i ≥ x j , and hence our proposed strategy assures that Bidder i wins if and only if it is profitable to win.
Finally note that the price cannot be below b nd (0) the reason is that there is always another non-deviating bidder, and she never bids below that point if she follows our proposed strategies.
The proof that the proposed strategies implementφ S is identical to that of the proof of Proposition 1.
Finally, straightforward computations show that the deviating bidder's expected utility with type 0 is as stated in the Proposition.
